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ABSTRACT
The significant growth in employers’ use of labor intermediaries—that is, third parties
that stand between the workers and the organizations for whom they complete work—
has fundamentally changed how many low-wage workers enter and function in the
workplace. Temporary staffing agencies that hire and place workers with companies
and organizations have taken on a gatekeeper role to low-wage jobs in many industries.
Recent litigation and various reports allege flagrant hiring discrimination by temporary
staffing agencies whose clients encourage them not to hire African American workers
and hire and send Latinx immigrants instead. This Article explores the discriminatory
treatment of low-wage African American workers by temporary staffing agencies and
considers potential theoretical explanations for what appears to be not simply the
discriminatory acts of an outlier individual or employer, but a business model that
accepts racially discriminatory practices as business necessity. This Article proceeds
from the descriptive to the prescriptive. It deconstructs the problematic racial narratives
that position African American workers at the bottom of the low-wage worker hierarchy
and interrogates the normative consequences of these narratives as they manifest in
temporary staffing employment. Ultimately, this Article suggests potential legal
strategies that would better protect workers from discrimination in this rapidly growing
low-wage employment space.
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INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the Fall of 2014, Kevin James sought short-term employment
positions through a temporary staffing agency, Most Valuable Personnel
(“MVP”), in Chicago, Illinois.1 He applied for approximately twenty jobs
through MVP.2 Each day, he sat in the MVP office and watched Latinx 3
applicants receive job assignments, while he did not.4 The only readily apparent
difference between James and those who received assignments was the color of
his skin: James is African American.5 Despite his belief that he was highly
qualified for the positions he sought through MVP, James received only one
placement—at a packaging company where he described the supervisors as
hostile and “hovering” over him and other African American workers.6 James,
along with other African American workers who had sought placements
through MVP and received similar treatment, filed a class action lawsuit against
the staffing agency and its clients.7
Upon investigating James’s and other workers’ claims, their counsel
discovered a particularly disturbing phenomenon: MVP systematically excluded
African American workers from job placements in favor of Latinx workers.8
According to a former MVP employee responsible for dispatching laborers to
clients, some of MVP’s clients did not want African Americans assigned to work
at their companies—and MVP accommodated those requests.9 She claimed that
representatives from client companies yelled at her when she assigned African
See Complaint ¶ 65, Hunt v. Pers. Staffing Grp., (N.D. Ill. 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-11086),
2016 WL 11678533.
2 See Liam Stack, Black Workers’ Suit Accuses Job Agency of Favoring Hispanic Applicants ,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/us/lawsuit-allegesdiscrimination-against-blacks-at-national-job-agency.html.
3 I use the term “Latinx” throughout this Article, unless I am quoting a particular source
that uses the term “Hispanic” (in which case I use the term that appears in the original source).
The terms technically have different meaning. “Latinx” typically refers to persons of Latin
American descent. “Hispanic” typically refers to persons who speak Spanish as a common
language. See Sherley E. Cruz, Coding for Cultural Competency: Expanding Access to Justice with
Technology, 86 TENN. L. REV. 347, 351 n.18 (2019); Adrianna Rodriguez, ‘Latinx’ Explained: A
History of the Controversial Word and How to Pronounce It, USA TODAY (June 29, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/06/29/latina-latino-latinx-hispanicwhat-do-they-mean/1596501001/, archived at https://perma.cc/7BGG-W3C3. Scholars often
use the terms interchangeably.
4 Stack, supra note 2.
5 Complaint ¶ 9, Hunt v. Pers. Staffing Grp., No. 1:16-cv-11086 (N.D. Ill. 2016), 2016 WL
11678533.
6 Stack, supra note 2.
7 Complaint, Hunt v. Pers. Staffing Grp., No. 1:16-cv-11086 (N.D. Ill. 2016), 2016 WL
11678533.
8 Id. ¶¶ 89–90.
9 Declaration of Rosa Ceja ¶¶ 9, 17, Hunt v. Pers. Staffing Grp ., 2018 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 59 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-11086), 2018 WL 1014513.
1
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American workers to their job sites and that MVP’s managers had warned her
not to send African American workers to clients because MVP would lose those
clients’ accounts.10 She further stated that she received explicit instructions not
to use the terms “Hispanic,” “Latino,” “black,” or “African American,” but
instead to use code words like “feos,”11 or “bilingues” (“bilinguals”) to refer to
Latinx workers, and “guapos”12 or “no bilingues” (“not bilinguals”) to refer to
African Americans.13
Another MVP dispatcher similarly claimed that a client manager told her
“not to assign African American laborers to work at [the company] because they
were lazy, they were troublemakers and their job performance is poor, or words
to that effect, and that he wanted only Hispanic laborers.”14 Other client
supervisors and staff echoed this preference for Latinx over African American
workers.15 The dispatcher further claimed that on the rare occasions MVP sent
African American workers to the client company, she only assigned them to
weekend shifts so the client could avoid paying Latinx workers overtime, or to
shorter assignments that were more difficult to fill.16 She explained that her
supervisors trained her to give African American and Latinx job applicants
different instructions.17 When African Americans requested applications, she
would tell them she could only give them applications if MVP had open job
orders and to return at four a.m. to see if work was available.18 When they needed
extra workers to fill particularly difficult job orders, such as those occurring in
severe weather or involving thirteen-hour shifts, she might allow an African
American worker to apply for the job.19 She would, however, immediately give
applications to Latinx workers, immediately assign them to jobs, and call other
MVP offices to find work for them.20 The dispatcher also received instructions
to require African American applicants to complete criminal background
checks, but not to require the same of Latinx applicants.21

Id. ¶ 17.
According to the complaint filed in the case, “feos” translates to “dirty ones,” as in those
who are willing to do work that would get them dirty. Complaint for Plaintiff ¶ 25, Hunt, 2018
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 59 (No. 1:16-cv-11086).
12 According to the complaint filed in the case, “guapos” translates to “pretty boys,” as in
those who are unwilling to do dirty work. Id.
13 Ceja, supra note 9, ¶ 19.
14 Declaration of Pamela Sanchez ¶ 11, Hunt, 2018 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 59 (No.
1:16-cv-11086).
15 Id. ¶ 12.
16 Id. ¶ 13.
17 Id. ¶¶ 12-21.
18 Id. ¶ 21a.
10
11

19
20
21

Id.
Id. ¶ 21b.

Declaration of Pamela Sanchez, supra note 14, ¶ 27.
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This story mirrors other suits filed in Chicago22 and reflects a phenomenon
that plaintiffs’ counsel and advocates believe occurs across the country: a
business practice predicated on blatant racial discrimination.23 The legality of
these practices is not in question. Temporary staffing agencies’ and their clients’
exclusion of job applicants based upon their race indisputably violates Title VII,
Section 1981, and state and local discrimination laws.24 Nevertheless, advocates
and former agency employees allege persistent and widespread discrimination
by temporary staffing agencies and their clients.
Moreover, the type of systematic discrimination alleged in the temporary
staffing cases challenges common assumptions about the prevailing contours of
racial discrimination at a time when many assume discriminatory employment
decisions are rare,25 based upon the animus of a rogue decision-maker,26 or
rooted in implicit bias.27 What leads employers to engage in overt, systematic
workplace discrimination in a society and legal regime that purport to favor
See, e.g., Complaint, Pruitt v. Pers. Staffing Corp., No. 1:16-cv-0079 (N.D. Ill. 2017), 2017
WL 1128457; Complaint, Lucas v. Gold Standard Baking, Inc., 121 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1488 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-01524), 2014 WL 518000.
23 See, e.g., Will Evans, When Companies Hire Temp Workers by Race, Black Applicants Lose
Out, REVEAL NEWS ORG. (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/when-companieshire-temp-workers-by-race-black-applicants-lose-out, archived at https://perma.cc/35YMM7DF (discussing allegations that temporary staffing agencies discriminate against African
American workers in six states); Kelly Heyboer, No ‘Ghetto People’: How Temp Agencies Allegedly
Hire Based on Race and Gender, NEW JERSEY REAL-TIME NEWS (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://www.nj.com/news/index/index.ssf/2016.09/no-ghetto-people-how-temp-agenciesallegedly-hire.html, archived at https://perma.cc/W5MT-48MK (discussing lawsuits alleging
widespread discrimination in the temporary staffing industry).
24 Many states and localities have enacted statutes that mirror or expand upon federal civil
rights legislation. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.01–1411.06; MD. CODE ANN. ART. 49B § 16.
25 See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1293 (2012) (discussing psychologists’ finding of a
“pronounced unwillingness” to attribute actions to discrimination).
26 See Llezlie Green Coleman, Disrupting the Discrimination Narrative: An Argument for Wage
and Hour Laws’ Inclusion in Antisubordination Advocacy, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 49, 60 (2018)
(“The prevalent narrative, and the statutes that attempt to respond to it, cast discrimination as
acts a single ‘bad’ actor commits. Animus against the employee based upon that employee’s
identity motivates invidious discrimination. This animus is illogical and deviates from accepted
societal values. In other words, discrimination, particularly as it is currently conceived, resides in
the realm of the outliers.”); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1124, 1169–86 (2012) (considering strategies for addressing implicit bias in the courtroom).
27 See William M. Wiececk & Judy L. Hamilton, Beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Confronting Structural Racism in the Workplace, 74 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1100 (2014) (“[T]he cause
of racial justice must move beyond the Civil Rights Act’s focus on explicit racism and its overt
manifestations to grapple with implicit racism and its structural expressions.”); see generally
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006)
(discussing the ability of the current antidiscrimination framework to address discrimination
arising from implicit bias). But see generally Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea
for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193 (2018) (challenging the prevalence of the implicit bias
narrative and arguing that much of what is defined as implicit bias is actually explicit bias).
22
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formal racial equality28 and, indeed, frequently espouse the belief that the United
States is post-racial?29
It is plausible that both the clients and the temporary staffing agencies
fulfilling those clients’ discriminatory requests to exclude African American
workers from their workplaces do not view themselves as racist. Rather, both
see themselves as engaging in discrimination as business necessity. The agency
clients may claim that the need for a hard-working, pliable workforce to handle
quick-moving daily tasks without complaint drives their decision-making, not
racial animus.30 Hiring Latinx workers, therefore, is just “good business” because
they are the most efficient workers. The temporary staffing agencies, on the
other hand, may try to absolve themselves of any moral blame by contending
they are simply meeting their clients’ needs by supplying the particular workforce
requested.31 That is, their clients are the social (and legal) deviants, not them.
The temporary staffing agencies are simply caught in the middle of an economic
quandary — discriminate or lose their clients and their business.32
The other likely dynamic at play in these decisions, however, is the perceived
vulnerability and therefore, exploitability, of the immigrant workforce.33 Various
See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social
Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 28 (discussing
28

implicit bias as a potential “explanation for the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in a society
that favors formal racial equality”).
29 See Charlotte S. Alexander, et al., Post-Racial Hydraulics: The Hidden Dangers of the
Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11–16 (2016) (discussing the development of post-racial
legal norms); Tanya Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment Discrimination
Cases—the Implicit Association Test Research as Social Framework Evidence, 32 LAW & INEQ. 309,
314 (2014) (“Today the ‘post-racial’ social norm is that racism is an aberration instigated by
consciously malicious individuals.”).
30 Indeed, in ethnographic studies, employers often link their racialized preference for
certain workers to the need for a compliant workforce that is able to quickly accomplish the
necessary tasks, rather than to general preferences for one group over another. See, e.g., Laura
López-Sanders, Trapped at the Bottom: Racialized and Gendered Labor Queues in New Immigrant
Destinations 15 (Ctr. for Comp. Immigr. Stud., Working Paper No. 176, 2009) (Explaining that
employers considered Latinx workers more attractive due to “[a]ttributes such as vulnerability,
compliance and disposition to submit to managerial control made workers more attractive as
replacements.”) Cf. Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 1161, 1175–76 (2008) (“Again and again, in comparative studies, managers characterize
new immigrants as desirable employees for their willingness to work long hours at dirty, boring,
or dangerous jobs for low wages and for their compliant attitude and work ethic.”).
31 This argument might absolve them of moral blame, but it would not absolve them of
legal liability for selecting workers based upon their race or ethnicity.
32 This quandary is not a new phenomenon. One need only consider the actions of
restaurants and other businesses during the Jim Crow era to identify similar circumstances in
which establishments argued they could not serve African Americans and maintain their White
business clientele.
33 See KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS
ARE NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 59–60 (2008); JOHN
SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE 218
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articles and reports on the treatment of immigrant workers in the low-wage
workplace point to employers’ preference for workers who are easily
exploitable.34
This Article considers these complicated phenomena as well as how
structural and legal barriers to the enforcement of our civil rights laws have left
spaces for such a discriminatory business practice to take root. As a litigator, I
recognize that litigation plays an important role in enforcing statutes and
disincentivizing discrimination. One solution to discrimination in temporary
staffing agencies is to increase workers’ access to counsel with the resources to
bring class action suits and impact litigation across the country to challenge this
practice. This solution would involve removing legal and structural barriers to
these cases.
The critical race theory inquiry, however, dictates a different approach to
legal problem solving. How does a society that continues to propound colorblind and post-racial values35 co-exist with explicit discrimination as a standard
operating procedure and a business model? Here, narrative, stock stories, and
stereotypes may provide an explanation and animate the need for a solution that
changes the narrative about low-wage African American workers.
This Article threads the needle between the realities of discrimination against
low-wage African American workers by temporary staffing agencies and their
clients, and both the normative and theoretical contexts that support these
practices. Part I explains the structure of temporary staffing agencies and places
them within the broader context of recent trends that de-couple employer roles,
thus destabilizing worker protections. Part II considers John Skrentny’s racial
realism theory as it manifests in the temporary staffing agency context. Part III
explores the dominant narratives about African American and Latinx low-wage
workers and discusses those narratives’ role in reinforcing class-based racial
stereotypes that allow employers to discriminate without ascribing racist animus
to themselves. The Article also posits that changing the narrative about the
working poor is necessary to address low-wage worker discrimination. Part IV
considers the potential for Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati’s “Working
Identity” performative identity theory to explain the prevalence of low-wage
worker discrimination. Part V then turns to consider the structural and legal
barriers to litigating temporary staffing cases and suggests potential
opportunities to improve workers’ access to justice.

(2013).
34 See, e.g., Laura López-Sanders, Trapped at the Bottom: Racialized and Gendered Labor
Queues in New Immigrant Destinations 15 (Ctr. for Comp. Immigr. Stud., Working Paper No. 176,

2009).
See Coleman, supra note 26, at 63–67 (discussing post-racialism and its critics); see also
Hutchinson, supra note 28, at 27 (“Researchers have tried to explain why racism persists in a
society with legal and cultural norms that mandate racial egalitarianism.”).
35
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I. CHANGING W ORKPLACE RELATIONSHIPS
In order to contextualize the discrimination discussed in this Article, it is
helpful to first consider the expansion of temporary staffing arrangements and
its relationship to other significant changes in the employment ecosystem.
A. Temporary Staffing Agencies and the De-Coupling of Employer Roles
The standard employment arrangement assumes employees work full-time,
for extended periods of time, at the employer’s place of business, supervised by
the employer.36 In recent years, the employment market has witnessed a decoupling of these responsibilities from the single employer and the sharing of
these roles among different workplace actors.37 Various actors often perform
the many roles typically associated with vertical employment, including hiring,
firing, training, compensation, and supervision: according to Professor Brishen
Rogers, “[t]wo or more contractual intermediaries often stand between
[unskilled and semi-skilled workers] and the companies whose floors they clean,
chickens they catch, vegetables they pick, goods they process, or garments they
sew.”38 Corporations, therefore, both maintain control over “the provision of
their services and the manufacture of their products,” while also “shed[ding]
responsibility for compliance with core labor standards.”39 In this context,
employment intermediaries that provide discrete services to businesses have
disrupted the traditional workplace.40
Temporary staffing agencies are one type of labor intermediary.41 Temporary
staffing agencies typically place workers at temporary jobs in their clients’

See generally Arne L. Kalleberg, Nonstandard Employment Relations: Part-Time, Temporary
and Contract Work, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 341 (2000) (describing traditional work arrangements).
37 See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the
Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1681 (2016) (“The process of ‘vertical integration,’
36

wherein firms generate goods and services internally, has drastically declined over the last several
decades.”).
38 Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 1, 17 (2010).
39 REBECCA SMITH & CLAIRE MCKENNA, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT &
NATIONAL STAFFING WORKERS ALLIANCE, TEMPED OUT: HOW THE DOMESTIC
OUTSOURCING OF BLUE-COLLAR JOBS HARMS AMERICA’S WORKERS 3 (2014).
40 See Rogers, supra note 30, at 17 (noting that unskilled and semi-skilled workers navigating
third party intermediaries find themselves excluded from employment law coverage because
they are not “employed” by the companies for whom they provide services.)
41 See SMITH & MCKENNA, supra note 39, at 5 (“The Bureau of Labor Statistics classifies
the industry encompassing temporary work as ‘Employment Services,’ which includes
temporary help services, professional employer organizations (PEOs), and employment
placement agencies.”).
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workplaces.42 These staffing arrangements take a few different forms, primarily
temporary employment agencies and contract firms.43 Temporary employment
agencies often employ the workers they place. They recruit, screen, and
sometimes train the workers they send to clients’ job sites.44 The agencies set the
rate of pay and handle the tax and social security withholdings and workers’
compensation coverage.45 Finally, the agencies bill their clients for these
services.46
Temporary staffing agencies have existed for decades and are not new to the
employment space.47 However, temporary staffing agencies have shifted from
operating in largely the administrative staffing space to operating in more bluecollar and manufacturing spaces.48 In particular, the number of temporary
workers in merchandise warehouses has grown significantly in recent years. 49
For example, a logistics company manages Wal-Mart’s two largest warehouses
and “subcontracts to an ever-changing cast of third-party logistics firms and
See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002,
APPLICATION OF EEO LAWS TO CONTINGENT WORKERS PLACED BY TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER STAFFING FIRMS 3 (1997).
43 Contract firms operate somewhat differently than temporary employment agencies.
These firms typically contract with clients to provide long-term services at the clients’ work sites.
Id. at 4. The firms often handle the same terms of employment described above for staffing
agencies, but they also take on the day-to-day supervision of workers at the clients’ job sites. Id.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) identifies additional types of
staffing firms that do not fit neatly into these two categories:
For example, ‘facilities staffing’ is an arrangement in which a staffing firm provides
one or more workers to staff a particular client operation on an ongoing basis, but
does not manage the operation. Under another model, a client of a staffing firm puts
its workers on the firm’s payroll, and the firm leases the workers back to the client.
The purpose of this arrangement is to transfer the responsibilities for administering
payroll and benefits from the client to the staffing firm. A staffing firm that offers
this service does not recruit, screen, or train the workers. Id.
44 Id. at 3; see also SMITH & MCKENNA, supra note 39, at 5 (“Temporary work largely refers
to arrangements in which workers are placed with an employer by an agency and are paid by the
agency, but generally are not directly supervised by the agency at the worksite.”).
45 See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 42.
46 Id.
47 Indeed, in some counties, an even larger percentage of workers are temporary. For
example, ProPublica reported in 2013 that one in fourteen workers in Kane County, Illinois,
worked a temporary job. Other counties, including Grand Rapids, Michigan; Middlesex County,
New Jersey; Memphis, Tennessee; the Inland Empire, California; and Lehigh, Pennsylvania, had
similar rates of temporary work. Michael Grabell, The Expendables: How the Temps Who Power
Corporate
Giants
are
Getting
Crushed,
PROPUBLICA
(June
27,
2013),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-expendables-how-the-temps-who-power-corporategiants-are-getting-crushe, available at https://perma.cc/S8TB-GGD6. One in twelve workers
in Greenville County, South Carolina, worked in temporary positions. See id.
48 See SMITH & MCKENNA, supra note 39, at 3–4; Grabell, supra note 47. (“The
overwhelming majority of [temporary work] growth has come in blue-collar work in factories
and warehouses, as the temp industry sheds the Kelly Girl image of the past.”).
49 See Grabell, supra note 47.
42
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staffing companies.”50 A recent report by the National Employment Law Project
(“NELP”) decries a shift from temporary staffing agencies merely existing to
their institutionalization as the companies’ norm.51
Over the last three decades, the number of workers employed through
temporary staffing agencies has increased steadily and significantly.52 In fact, in
1997 the EEOC reported that temporary employment agencies employed more
than 2.3 million workers—twice the number reported in 1991.53 Since then,
others have placed the number of temporary workers closer to three million.54
Furthermore, “[s]ince 2010, the staffing industry has added more jobs to the
U.S. economy than any other sector.”55 Indeed, the American Staffing
Association contends that each year, a tenth of all workers find employment
through temporary staffing agencies.56
Moreover, while temporary staffing is not a new phenomenon in the
workplace, in recent years it has developed into a “core business strategy for
many companies.”57 Companies that may have previously used temporary
staffing to meet specific, narrow, and genuinely temporary needs now contract
with agencies for temporary workers to perform central tasks for their
companies.58 In 2013, 42 percent of temporary workers engaged in material
moving jobs, production jobs, and assembly and fabrication jobs, while only
21 percent held office and administrative jobs.59 The recent recession and
economic instability may have exacerbated this shift. Companies experiencing
significant economic uncertainty searched for ways to cheaply produce products
and provide services, and they appreciated the flexibility a temporary work force
provided.60
50

Id.
See SMITH & MCKENNA, supra note 39, at 4.
52 See Rogers, supra note 38, at 15. (“In the past thirty years . . . temporary labor agencies
51

and labor-only subcontractors have grown significantly as an overall proportion of the
workforce.”); see also Louis Uchitelle, Labor Data Show Surge in Hiring of Temp Workers, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2009),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/21temps.ht
ml, archived at https://perma.cc/7UNW-E7BY.
53 See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 42, at 3.
54 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., 362 N.L.R.B. 1599, 1609 (2015) (“As of August 2014,
the number of workers employed through temporary agencies had climbed to a new high of
2.87 million, a 2 percent share of the nation’s work force.”). A Bureau of Labor Statistics report
forecast an increase in the number of persons employed through employment services industry
(of which temporary staffing agencies are a subset) to almost four million by 2022 . See id.
55 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 37, at 1682.
56 CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS, ET AL., NAT’L EMP. L. PROJ., WHO’S THE BOSS: RESTORING
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LABOR STANDARDS IN OUTSOURCED WORK 19 (2014) (citing Grabell,
supra note 4747).
57 SMITH & MCKENNA, supra note 39, at 4.
58

Id.
Id. at 6.
60 See Katherine S. Newman, The Great Recession and the Pressure on Workplace Rights, 88
59
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The structure and size of staffing companies has also diversified. They now
“range from national and multinational firms that contract with hundreds of
host employers to smaller, often undercapitalized, local firms.”61 The growth of
smaller, undercapitalized firms creates particular challenges to the enforcement
of employment laws. Professor Cunningham-Parmeter observes that “nearly all
cases in which workers seek to hold end-user firms liable for wage violations
begin with the discovery that intermediaries have no assets to satisfy
judgments.”62 Furthermore, smaller companies more easily file for bankruptcy
or disappear and reorganize under a different name in order to avoid paying any
significant judgments.63 Assuming a low-wage worker overcomes the structural
and procedural hurdles to enforcing her substantive legal rights,64 a finding of
liability and damages without the ability to enforce the judgment may prove a
hollow victory.
With the growth of the temporary worker market, the types of jobs have
also diversified.65 Indeed, the market now includes “janitorial and security
services, garment manufacturing, agriculture, unskilled construction, and
warehouse work.”66 According to a recent NELP report, three occupations
make up the largest share of the staffing industry employment: material-moving
workers, other production occupations, and assembly line workers and
fabricators.67 This is consistent with the report’s assertion that 77 percent of
Fortune 500 companies contract with third-party logistics firms to move their
products.68 Their temporary workers “unpack, load, and ship goods to retail
facilities across the country.”69 The tiered employment structure often becomes
more pronounced as corporations contract with multiple temporary staffing

CHI-KENT L. REV. 529, 533 (2013) (discussing the cost advantages of temporary staffing as
“particularly valuable in the Great Recession when consumer demand was down and profit
margins were squeezed.”).
61 SMITH & MCKENNA, supra note 39, at 3.
62 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 37, at 1690.
63 Id. (“Because many contractors are smaller in scale and can exit the market more easily
than end-user firms, they can nimbly dodge enforcement actions in ways that their customers
cannot.”).
64 See Llezlie Green Coleman, Wage Theft in Lawless Courts, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1303, 1307
(2019).
65 See supra note 54 (discussing the expansion of temporary work into a wider range of
occupations); see also, Rogers, supra note 38, at 16. (“Thus as manufacturing has migrated
overseas, as technological innovations have rendered supply-chain management less expensive,
and as the economy has shifted toward service rather than production industries, the number of
domestic jobs which require no firm-specific skills and little monitoring has grown in both
absolute and relative terms, and entire industries have come to be organized around the spot
market for labor.”).
66 Rogers, supra note 38, at 16.
67 See SMITH & MCKENNA, supra note 39, at 6.
68 See id. at 7.
69

Id.
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agencies to provide workers to the same job site where a third-party logistics
firm supervises the workers.70
The growth in temporary staffing jobs shows no signs of slowing and aligns
with a steady increase in the contingent work force. As such, evidence of
rampant racial discrimination within the sector merits significant concern and
attention.
B. Worker Exploitation in De-Coupled Workplaces
Scholars and advocates have expressed concerns about increases in worker
exploitation where de-coupled employment practices and labor intermediaries
have proliferated.71 Employers typically engage labor intermediaries as a costsaving measure. Indeed, paying for a contractual relationship with an
independent contractor is less expensive than taking on the various human
resources expenses associated with directly employing workers.72
In their report Temped Out, NELP posited that staffing agency employment
creates confusion for workers about who actually employs them and therefore,
workers may be less likely to assert their labor and employment protections.73
According to the report, staffing agencies also engage in a fiercely competitive
market, which reduces worker protections:
Because staffing agencies’ profits are based on the “markup” they
charge host employers, they almost automatically must provide lower
wages and fewer benefits than the lead firm. Cutthroat competition in
the industry can induce companies to cut corners, by underpaying
workers, exposing them to safety and health risks, committing
70
71

Id.
See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 37, at 1689. The growth of outsourced

employment is occurring within the broader context of changing dynamics in the workplace.
Another significant shift in the employment relationship—the development of the “gig”
economy—has also resulted in challenges to regulation and protection of workers. See, e.g.,
Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105, 110 (2018)
(assessing the viability of creating a formal intermediate category of employees in response to
the rapid emergence of the sharing or “gig” economy); Veena B. Dubal, Winning the Battle,
Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy,
2017 WIS. L. REV. 739, 745–48 (2017) (assessing recent litigation concerning gig economy
workers and the potential impact of those cases); Wendi S. Lazar & Nantiya Ruan, Is There a
Future for Work?, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 343, 345 (2018) (expressing concern for
the rise in job insecurity resulting from the “gig economy”). The massive and rapid growth of
platforms like Lyft and Uber, which claim to retain independent contractors rather than hire
employees, has created a growing space in which companies operate outside employment and
labor laws. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 56, at 27–31.
72 See SMITH & MCKENNA, supra note 39, at 1 (“Staffing agencies may take over all of the
former employer’s responsibilities for wages, health and safety, compliance with discrimination
laws, and provision of workplace benefits.”).
73 Id. at 11.
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unlawful discrimination, and defrauding state workers’ compensation
funds.74
Scholars and advocates echo these concerns, pointing to depressed wages
where labor intermediaries employ workers75 and to temporary workers typically
earning 25 percent less than permanent workers.76
This interest in cost-savings also reduces protections and creates an
atmosphere that is ripe for exploitation. According to Professor CunninghamParmeter, the drive to reduce costs leads labor intermediaries to engage in
unlawful employment practices like failing to pay for unemployment or workers’
compensation insurance.77 As Cunningham-Parmeter explains, “[b]y cutting
corners in these areas, labor intermediaries can pass the cost-savings of
regulatory noncompliance to larger firms who can avoid the reputational harm
associated with these violations.”78
In a second report, NELP described a “race-to-the-bottom” in which
outsourcing leads to increased violations of workers’ substantive employment
rights.79 According to NELP: “In at least some segments of key industries,
competing firms cannot survive unless they violate workers’ compensation laws,
skimp on their unemployment insurance taxes, and pay less than the required
minimum or prevailing wages . . . .”80
While scholars have considered the impact of outsourcing on wages and
violations of wage, hour, and workplace health and safety statutes, its impact on
the proliferation of employment discrimination has received little attention.
Where temporary staffing agencies—particularly small, under-capitalized
agencies—face significant challenges to remaining competitive, it follows that
those pressures would make them more likely to engage in racially
discriminatory practices. In the cases discussed herein, the plaintiffs allege—and
the signed affidavits from temporary staffing agency employees confirm—that
agencies discriminated against African American workers at their clients’
instruction. Workers allege that staffing agencies and clients subscribed to
74

Id.
See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 37, at 1689.
76 See Grabell, supra note 47.
77 See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 37, at 1689–90.
78 Id. at 1690.
79 See RUCKELSHAUS, supra note 56, at 27.
80 Id. A news article reports:
75

The temp system insulates the host companies from workers’ compensation
claims, unemployment taxes, union drives and the duty to ensure that their
workers are citizens or legal immigrants. In turn, the temps suffer high injury
rates, according to federal officials and academic studies, and many of them
endure hours of unpaid waiting and face fees that depress their pay below
minimum wage.
Grabell, supra note 47.
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negative racial stereotypes and that those stereotypes were the basis of wrongful
employment actions. Moreover, the allegations point to a willingness to engage
in explicit violations of various civil rights statutes as a business practice in the
temporary agency space.81

II. RACIAL REALISM
While the racially discriminatory exclusion of African Americans from
temporary staffing positions may shock the conscience, the allegations are
consistent with social scientists’ assessment of race in the low-wage workspace.
Traditionally, antidiscrimination laws and programs largely discourage or forbid
the use of race in employment decisions.82 However, sociologist John Skrentny
argues that, despite the legal constraints on considering race in employment
decisions, racial considerations continue to manifest in the workplace in
meaningful ways, many of which he considers positive. 83 He terms this process
“racial realism.”84
Skrentny identifies three strategies he argues decision-makers employ in
managing race in employment, law, and politics. First, the classical liberal
strategy seeks a color-blind workplace.85 Its adherents contend that justice
depends on race having no significance and, therefore, no utility in the
workplace.86 He contends the second strategy, which he terms affirmative action
81 News articles on the practice reference its occurrence across industries and in various
cities across the country. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 23 (discussing one company’s alleged gender
discrimination in Tennessee and California); Heyboer, supra note 23.
82 See RUCKELSHAUS, supra note 56, at 27. Affirmative action programs are the obvious
exception, although the courts have significantly narrowed their use, particularly outside of
higher education. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (finding
unconstitutional an affirmative action program in city government contracting); see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732 (2007) (finding
unconstitutional a city’s efforts to create racially diverse schools through the consideration of
race in the elementary school lottery program).
83 See generally SKRENTNY, supra note 33. Workplace diversity programs are a second
example of race-conscious employment programs. These efforts are characterized by “policies
and practices designed to expand opportunities for and inclusion of all persons in the
workplace” and especially those in underrepresented communities. Stacy L. Hawkins, The Long

Arc of Diversity Bends Toward Equality: Deconstructing the Progressive Critique of Workplace
Diversity Efforts, 17 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 61, 64–65 (2017).

Professor Derrick Bell first coined the phrase “racial realism” to describe the futility of
efforts to achieve racial equality in the United States, given the permanence of racism. See
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992). Skrentny’s “racial realism” takes
a decidedly different approach in his discussion of race in the workplace. See, e.g., Gilda R.
Daniels, Voting Realism, 104 KY. L. J. 583, 588–90 (2016) (contrasting Bell and Skrentny’s
theories).
85 See SKRENTNY, supra note 33, at 4.
84

86

Id.
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liberalism, assumes we must see race in order to move beyond race.87 Here, “race
has meaning for employment, but only to ensure the goal of justice and
specifically, equal opportunity.”88 Affirmative action realism assumes that race
is significant, but not particularly useful.89 The third strategy, racial realism,
assumes race has both significance and usefulness, by “mak[ing] a frank
assessment of the utility of race for organizational goals.”90 Indeed, racial realism
promotes “organizational effectiveness” over equal opportunity.91 It recognizes
the importance of race to worker identity and argues that business, government,
and institutions can and should use racial differences to advance their
organizations’ goals.92 Skrentny argues that racial realism is entrenched or
supported in various workplaces despite the lack of “explicit legal authorization
in almost all of them.”93
Skrentny’s analysis of racial realism in various employment sectors, including
skilled private employment, politics and government, and media and
entertainment, suggests employers use race in ways that both advance the
employer’s objectives and enhance employees’ opportunities.94 Skrentny
characterizes the use of race in these sectors as largely positive.
However, Skrentny’s research on low-wage workplaces reveals a more
troubling form of racial realism. In what he describes as the “darkest corner of
American racial realism,”95 Skrentny traces the use of racialized stereotypes of
low-wage workers that advantage Latinx, white, and Asian workers over African
American workers.96 He relies upon various studies, many discussed in further
detail below, to reach the conclusion that low-wage employers apply their
negative perceptions of African American low-wage workers to exclude them
from the workplace.97 Therefore, unlike in other employment spaces, racial
realism in low-wage work relies upon problematic stereotypes that lead to the
exclusion of African Americans and preference for immigrant workers.98 This
See id. at 18.
See id. at 6.
89 See id. at 8.
90 See id. at 10.
87
88

John D. Skrentny, Have We Moved Beyond the Civil Rights Revolution?, 123 YALE L.J. 3002,
3011 (2014); see also Daniels, supra note 84, at 589.
92 See SKRENTNY, supra note 33, at 10.
93 Id. at 18.
94 Id. at 38–215.
95 Id. at 218.
96 Id. at 216–45.
97 See id. at 222–27.
98 In this scenario, however, all immigrants are not created equal. Indeed, Skrentny points
out employers often grouped Latinos from island nations with African Americans. See id. at 222.
He also points to sociologist Margaret Chin’s study of immigrant-owned businesses in New
York City, in which she found employers expressed an aversion to both African Americans and
black immigrants. See id. at 229 (citing MARGARET M. CHIN, SEWING WOMEN: IMMIGRANTS
AND THE NEW YORK CITY GARMENT INDUSTRY 86 (2005)).
91
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racial realism is deeply entrenched, despite clearly violating civil rights laws.99
The distinction between this and other sectors is clear:
While all of the racial realism explored in this book prizes the
usefulness of certain racial backgrounds and tends to exclude
the less-favored backgrounds, it is only in this sector that we see
the familiar American pattern of African-Americans
consistently winding up at the back of the preference queue,
while employers valorize other groups.100
This modern-day version of Upton Sinclair’s “jungle”101 takes form in the
ways low-wage workplaces, through their temporary staffing agencies, create
racialized workplaces that either exclude African American workers altogether,
or limit them to the least desirable assignments. This Article next explores more
specifically the power of narratives in creating the stereotypes that drive lowwage employers to prefer Latinx workers and exclude African American
workers.

III. LOW-WAGE WORKER NARRATIVES: STOCK STORIES AND
STEREOTYPES
In our daily lives, we process information as narratives or stories.102 Stock
stories are narratives that take root in culture and inform the way we interpret
the world.103 Whether rooted in truth, half-truths, or “alternative facts,” stock
stories are powerful motivators in our everyday decision-making. According to
Professor Gerald P. López, we interpret the world through stock stories, which
“help us to make choices about asserting our own needs and responding to other
people.”104
Stock stories often become stereotypes about particular groups of people.
Stereotypes “are widely shared understandings about the features of
categorically distinct groups” that respond to our cognitive need to categorize
See SKRENTNY, supra note 33, at 219 (“Another critical feature of racial realism in lowskilled jobs is that it appears to be deeply entrenched even though it is often quite clearly in
violation of the most basic principle of equal opportunity and discrimination law: that we should
not judge individuals based on stereotypes.”).
100 Id. at 263.
101 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). Skrentny titled his chapter on low-wage workers,
“The Jungle Revisited? Racial Realism in the Low-Skilled Sector.” SKRENTNY, supra note 33, at
216.
102 According to Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Butler: “So predisposed is the human
mind to narrative that we even experience the events of everyday life in narrative form and
assign them to categories derived from some particular kind of story.” ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BUTLER, MINDING THE LAW 30–31 (2000).
103 See Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).
99

104

Id.
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things and people in our world.105 Statistical confirmation of some portions of
stereotypes may be possible, but they typically also possess aspects that are not
amenable to empirical testing.106 Perhaps most troubling, they are difficult to
dispel because they “possess the property of proving resistant to contradictory
evidence, even while consistent evidence is seen as confirmatory . . . .”107 This
phenomenon has led scholars to describe stereotypes as “resilient.”108
In his effort to explain the presence of racism without racists, Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva conducted a post-Civil Rights era ethnography.109 He identifies
racial stories that drive judgments.110 Bonilla-Silva’s discussion of what he terms
“story lines” is particularly useful here. He defines story lines as “socially shared
tales that are fable-like and incorporate a common scheme and wording.”111
Story lines, he explains, are “often based on impersonal, generic arguments, with
little narrative content.”112 Significantly, Bonilla-Silva characterizes the storylines
that he identified in his study as ideological in nature. He explains:
What makes these story lines “ideological” is that storytellers and their
audiences share a representational world that makes these stories seem
factual. Hence, by telling and retelling these storylines, members of a
social group (in this case, the dominant race) strengthen their collective
understanding about how and why the word is the way it is; indeed, these
stories tell and retell a moral story agreed upon by the participants. These
racial narratives, therefore, do more than assist dominant (and
subordinate) groups to make sense of the world in particular ways; they
also justify and defend (or challenge, in the case of oppositional stories)
current racial arrangements.113
Bonilla-Silva’s theory of the power of storylines is particularly significant
when applied to stock stories and stereotypes of low-wage workers that seem to
drive discriminatory decision-making in the temporary staffing industry.
The acceptance of racial stereotypes and narratives may explain the “racial
arrangements” in temporary staffing that prefer Latinx workers over African
American workers. It may also explain why the agencies and clients making
discriminatory hiring decisions may feel less guilty or culpable for racially
ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL I. LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS:
IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR 149 (2003).
105
106
107

See id.
Id.

108 PHILIP MOSS & CHRIS TILLY, STORIES EMPLOYERS TELL: RACE, SKILL, AND HIRING IN
AMERICA 87 (2001) (describing stereotypes as resilient because people remember things that
confirm them more readily than facts that contradict them and tend to view behavior that
challenges a stereotype as exceptional or situational).
109 See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 123–49 (4th ed. 2014).
110

See id.
Id. at 124 (italics omitted).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 124–25.
111
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discriminatory hiring. An analysis of the racial narratives associated with lowwage African American and Latinx workers follows below and contextualizes
this assertion.
A. African American Worker Narrative
As discussed above, Skrentny points to the role of negative stereotypes in
low-wage employers’ aversion to African American workers.114 William Julius
Wilson’s groundbreaking research on the inner-city black working class also
revealed rampant stereotyping.115 As Wilson explains, “the available research
does suggest that African Americans more than any other major racial group or
ethnic group, face negative employer perceptions about their qualifications and
their work ethic.”116
Prevalent narratives about African American workers are the result of a
complicated web of historical, sociological, and structural factors. In my prior
work, I identified some of the complex dynamics that have created consistently
negative stock stories about African American workers.117 Specifically, I argue
that the degradation of the war on poverty and the subsequent racialized
criminalization of poverty have resulted in the prevalence of problematic
narratives of low-wage African American workers.118 Sociologists Kathryn
Neckerman and Joleen Kirschenman have likewise argued that “[w]idespread
publicity, emphasizing poor schools, drug use, crime, and welfare dependency,
shapes the way city residents view the inner society and whom they associate
with it.”119
Much of employers’ critique of African American workers focuses on what
social scientists have termed “soft skills.” Skrentny argues that in a largely deskilled workplace more reliant on mechanization, employers are no longer
focused on a potential employee’s concrete skills as traditionally understood,
“but [on] . . . hard-to-measure qualities such as attitude, work ethic, and
reliability.”120 Indeed, Skrentny points to studies that show employers make
hiring decisions based upon ethnic stereotypes like “punctuality, reliability, [and

114

See SKRENTNY supra note 33, at 15–16.

WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD
URBAN POOR 111 (1996).
115
116

OF THE

NEW

Id.

Llezlie Green Coleman, Rendered Invisible: African American Low-Wage Workers and the
Workplace Exploitation Paradigm, 60 HOW. L.J. 61, 92–100 (2016).
118 Id. at 92–95.
119 Kathryn M. Neckerman & Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, and InnerCity Workers, 38 SOC, PROBS. 433, 433 (1991); see also SKRENTNY, supra note 33, at 226
117

(explaining that employers described African American workers as lacking a work ethic, due to
their over-reliance on the welfare system).
120 See SKRENTNY, supra note 33, at 221.
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the] willingness to work hard.”121 Within this rubric, “the antithesis of the good
Latino or Asian worker is the American-born black.”122
Indeed, Wilson notes that employers appeared to differentiate between
skilled and unskilled workers and more readily stereotype the latter. For
example, when asked about his opinions of African Americans as workers, a
manufacturer responded: “The black work ethic. There’s no work ethic. At least
at the unskilled. I’m sure with the skilled . . . as you go up, it’s a lot different.”123
Various other studies likewise discuss employers’ tendency to distinguish
between the assessment of African American workers’ hard skills and soft
skills.124 For example, Moss and Tilly explain that respondents to their surveys
framed concerns about African American low wage-workers’ hard skills as based
upon differences in the education they received, rather than a difference in their
capacity to obtain the skills.125 Professors Jennifer Gordon and Robin Lenhardt
describe social scientists’ studies that found that employers systematically
stereotype African Americans as undesirable workers 126 who are “unstable,
uncooperative, dishonest, and uneducated,” as well as unreliable and lazy.127
These narratives are based largely on stereotypes, rather than the concrete
racial animus that characterizes our historical understanding of discrimination.128
According to Moss and Tilly, “Not one employer told us, ‘I don’t like Blacks’ or
‘I prefer to hire someone from my own ethnic group.’ But many, many managers
made statements like ‘Blacks are less reliable’ or ‘Immigrants work harder.’” 129
121 Id. at 223 (quoting Philip Kasinitz and Jan Rosenberg, Missing the Connection: Social
Isolation and Employment on the Brooklyn Waterfront, 43 SOC. PROBS. 180, 189 (1996)).
122 SKRENTNY, supra note 33. Scholars have criticized and complicated the “good Latino”

worker narrative that presumes worker docility and compliance, and enables the employer to
more freely violate employment laws, including the wage and hour laws and OSHA regulations.
See, e.g., Leticia Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting Workers in
Increasingly Latino-Ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303, 314–17 (2004).
123 WILSON, supra note 115, at 113.
124 See MOSS & TILLY, supra note 108, at 96.
125 Id. (“Managers more often identified shortcomings in interaction skills and, especially,
motivation than deficits in hard skills among black workers.”).
126 See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 30, at 1175 (“Social scientists who show have studied
employer attitudes toward African Americans concur that employers have considerable
prejudice against native-born black workers.”).
127 Id. (quoting Joleen Kirshcenman & Katheryn M. Neckerman, “We’d Love to Hire Them,
But…”: The Meaning of Race for Employers, in 203 THE URB. UNDERCLASS 204 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991)); See also MOSS & TILLY, supra note 108, at 100–03.
Indeed, these narratives of the lazy African American worker echo many stereotypes that have
existed since their ancestors arrived on these shores in chains. Professor Ibram Kendi’s work
tracing the history of racist ideas in America discusses the ironic characterization of slaves as
lazy and slothful. See generally IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE
DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA (2016).
128 See Llezlie Green Coleman, Disrupting the Discrimination Narrative: An Argument for Wage
and Hour Laws’ Inclusion in Antisubordination Advocacy, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 49, 59–60 (2018).
129 See MOSS & TILLY, supra note 108, at 4.
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In other words, employers stated that African American low-wage workers are
not bad people; they are just lousy employees.130
As the studies above demonstrate, employers maintain overwhelmingly
negative narratives of African American low-wage workers’ performance in the
workplace. These problematic narratives co-exist with startlingly different
narratives about immigrant Latinx workers.
B. The Immigrant Latinx Worker Narrative
The stock story of the immigrant Latinx low-wage worker differs
significantly from that of the African American worker. The hard-working,
compliant Latinx worker narrative stands in direct contrast to the negative
stereotypes of African American workers. In the same work discussed above, 131
Professor John Skrentny identifies stereotypes of Latinx workers that sharply
contrast with those of African American workers. Citing a variety of reports and
books, Professor Skrentny explains that employers expressed largely positive
opinions about Latinx workers.132 A number of other studies have found that
employers apply a hard-working, compliant worker narrative to Latinx workers.
In López-Sanders’s study, she found that employers described Latinx workers
as “‘hard workers,’ ‘reliable,’ and ‘dependable.’”133
Professor Leticia Saucedo’s work speaks directly to the prevalence and
power of Latinx worker narratives. She argues that Latinx low-wage workers
have accepted and adopted certain narratives, often wearing them as a badge of
pride in the workplace. For example, between 2006 and 2008, Professor Saucedo
and Professor Maria Cristina Morales interviewed Latinx male construction
workers in Las Vegas about their border crossing and work experiences.134 They
discovered that the workers had adopted three specific narratives rooted in
masculinity and common to both experiences: (1) endurance, (2) family
provider, and (3) family order.135 In the workplace context, “the endurance
narrative is characterized by an acceptance of substandard working conditions,”
and the inability to contest workplace exploitation due to their immigration
status.136 The family provider narrative focused on the centrality of the worker’s
family-breadwinner role to his identity and his willingness to sacrifice for
130

See id.
See SKRENTNY, supra note 33, at 221–22.
132 See id. at 222 (stating that employers typically “place[ed] mostly positive meanings on
131

Mexicans, Guatemalans, and others of Central and South American origin”). He also noted,
however, that employers grouped Latino workers from island nations like Puerto Rico and the
Dominican Republic with African American workers. Id.
133 López-Sanders, supra note 34, at 14.
134 Leticia Saucedo and Maria Cristina Morales, Voices Without the Law: The Border Crossing
Stories and Workplace Attitudes of Immigrants, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641, 642 (2012).
135 Id. at 649–53.
136 Id. at 649.
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others.137 Finally, the family order narrative indicated the worker’s acceptance of
hierarchical family structures, which perhaps made him reticent to challenge
hierarchical structures in the workplace.138
In other work, Professor Saucedo identifies additional masculinity narratives
attributed to and adopted by Mexican workers, including the “structure of no
complaints,” where “[w]orkers are expected to put up with harsh conditions,
and even harassment.”139 She contends that workers accept this narrative and
choose to perform their identity in conformance with this expectation of “hard
work, subservience, and complacency.”140
Professor Saucedo argues that while these narratives reflect what many
would consider “positive” attributes of the immigrant Latinx worker, the reality
is more nuanced. She posits, for example, that reliance on these narratives
subjects immigrant workers to exploitation by their employers who assume they
will withstand substandard work conditions and treatment without complaint.141
Saucedo contends that employers thus create “brown-collar” workplaces that
offer low-wage Latinx immigrant workers depressed wages and fewer benefits,
and demand higher productivity then from white (and sometimes African
American) workers.142 In other words, while employers may claim to prefer
Latinx workers due to their strong work ethic, they also exploit them based upon
their perceived vulnerability. In doing so, employers create workplace conditions
that bear little resemblance to the ones that may have existed ten years ago. 143
These so-called brown-collar workplaces, despite hiring Latinx workers, actually
engage in their further subordination.
Laura López-Sanders’ 2009 ethnographic study of low-wage workers in a
manufacturing facility in South Carolina provides an example of how a low-wage
employer’s racial stereotyping can shape a workforce. She contends that the
manufacturing facility systematically used temporary staffing agencies to replace

137
138

Id.
Id. at 650.

139 Leticia M. Saucedo, The Three Theories of Discrimination in the Brown Collar Workplace, 1
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 345, 367 (2009) (citing KRIS PAAP, WORKING CONSTRUCTION: WHY WHITE
WORKING-CLASS MEN PUT THEMSELVES—AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT—IN HARM'S WAY
143–48 (2018)).
140 Id. at 370.
141 Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of
the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 976–80 (2006). Similarly, Professor Jayesh
Rathod has examined the life-threatening workplace safety violations tied to the Latinx
immigrant narrative of enduring dangerous conditions. Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and
the Occupational Safety and Health Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479, 493 (2009)
(discussing the “familiar narrative of immigrant agricultural workers who toil under dangerous,
sometimes deadly conditions”).
142 Saucedo, supra note 141, at 979–80.
143 Id. at 975 (“Once brown collar workers occupy a job, employers will devalue the position
and its function, pay rate, terms and conditions, and advancement ladder.”).
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its largely African American workforce with immigrant Latinx workers.144
López-Sanders argues that “[t]he temporary status of workers proved to be a
central factor facilitating the replacement of one ethnic group with another.” 145
She notes that employers’ stereotypes about ethnic and racial groups created a
hierarchical ranking of workers that led to the decision to replace one group
with another. Specifically, “native-born white male workers stood at the top,
followed by Hispanic male workers, Hispanic female workers, white American
females and, at the bottom, native-born African Americans.”146 Furthermore,
these employers preferred foreign-born Latinx immigrants to native-born Latinx
workers, and undocumented Latinx people above all.147 Ultimately, the
manufacturing facility shifted the racial demographics of their facility to reflect
these racialized worker preferences.148
Stock stories and stereotypes about African American and Latinx workers
create a racial hierarchy of workers: native-born whites at the top, followed by
immigrant whites, then immigrant Latinxs, and African Americans at the
bottom.149 Employers then weaponize those stereotypes by “using the ascribed
characteristics of groups viewed through the filter of inaccurate stereotypes to
predict individual behavior on the job.”150

IV. WORKING THEIR IDENTITY IN RESPONSE TO THE NARRATIVE
Performative theories of identity may also shed light on the persistence of
discrimination in the temporary worker space. Performative theories have their
origins in the work of feminist scholar Judith Butler, who contends that gender
identity is not fixed, but rather is constantly constructed and reconstructed based

López-Sanders, supra note 34, at 7–12.
Id. at 12.
146 Id. at 14.
144
145
147

Id.
Id. at 24–27.
149 Id. at 14 (describing a company’s systematic replacement of workers based upon
148

“employers’ prejudgments and stereotypes about different ethnic/racial groups [that] created a
system of discrimination that generated a specific rank ordering of workers”); see WALDINGER
& LICHTER, supra note 105, at 142 (discussing Professors Joleen Kirschenman and Kathleen
Neckerman’s research of Chicago-area employers’ views of about hiring different racial and
ethnic groups). Not all studies, however, found employers preferred white workers to Latinx
workers. For example, Professors Roger Waldinger and Michael I. Lichter assert that employers
in their study of the low-skilled labor market in Los Angeles opined that white workers did not
really want to work the low-skilled jobs, complained and whined about the job, and were
unwilling to remain in the positions for long. Id. at 157–60 (Indeed, an employer stated, “overall
Latinos are much better workers. They have a loyalty towards the company that white workers
don’t have.”).
150 WALDINGER & LICHTER, supra note 105, at 142.
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upon actions.151 As Butler explains, “[t]he view that gender is performative
sought to show that what we take to be an internal essence of gender is
manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered
stylization of the body.”152 As such, we all perform aspects of our gender identity
on a daily basis—we make choices about how to present ourselves that either
conform with or differ from particular norms. We are not simply a gender
because of our sex organs, but because we choose to demonstrate that gender
on a daily basis.
The performative nature of gender is the perhaps not-so-distant relative of
the social construction of race. A central tenet of critical race theory is the
assertion that race is socially constructed, rather than biologically determined. 153
Scientists have found that race is not determined by a gene or gene cluster and
is not dependent upon the rate of appearance of certain gene types.154 Moreover,
“greater genetic variation exists within the populations typically labeled Black and
White than between these populations.”155 Critical race theorists view race as not
as biologically determined, but rather as socially constructed by societal
institutions and further defined and reinforced by legal institutions. 156
Accordingly, race is not absolute and only has meaning because of definitions
and understandings that powerful institutions and structures attribute to it.157

151 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
xv (Linda J. Nicholson ed.,1999).
152

Id.
See generally Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
154 Id. at 11.
155 Id. at 12.
153

156 López describes the law as the “prime instrument in the construction and reinforcement
of racial subordination.” Id. at 3.
157 The judiciary, however, seems to lag behind in its understanding of race, often applying
seemingly biological definitions. Courts’ earlier conceptions of race made determinations based
largely on physical or biological understandings. For example, in 1806, the Virginia Supreme
Court determined that three generations of enslaved women were free based upon their
ancestor’s straight, long hair. Id. at 2–3 (discussing Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134
(Va. 1806)). Indeed, the court in Hudgins reasoned that “one is Black if one has a single African
antecedent, or if one has a ‘flat nose’ or a wooly head of hair.” Id. at 5. Recent court cases echo
this biological understanding of race. For example, in Rogers v. American Airlines and EEOC. v.
Catastrophe Management Solutions, the Southern District of New York and the Eleventh Circuit
found that employers’ policies prohibiting employees from wearing cornrows or dreadlocks do
not constitute racial discrimination because they do not implicate employees’ immutable
characteristics. See Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); EEOC
v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016) . Professor Wendy Greene
explains that the immutability doctrine “is a consequence of judicial understanding of identity,
namely racial and gender identity, as constitutive of fixed, biological characteristics–despite
scholars’ persuasive arguments to the contrary.” D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh
Circuit’s Take on Workplace Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. Catastrophe
Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987, 1028 (2017).
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Performative identity then considers how we demonstrate or “perform” our
socially constructed identities. Scholars have long decried the potentially
discriminatory nature of employers’ expectations that employees conform their
behavior to particular assumptions, tropes, or stereotypes.158 Racial identity
performance in the workplace thus provides necessary insight into workplace
racial dynamics.
A. “Working Identity” Theory
Critical race theorists Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have drawn upon
Butler’s and others’ work to consider the performative aspects of racial identity
in the workplace.159 They argue that workers engage in a form of racial identity
gymnastics in the workplace in order to navigate stereotypical narratives that
may hinder their success.160
Carbado and Gulati posit:
Anti-discrimination law and the reputational harms of maintaining allwhite work environments substantially diminish the likelihood that
employers will discriminate against all blacks. Employers who want to
discriminate are likely to do so by discriminating against a subset of
blacks based on their Working Identity. This creates an incentive for
black prospective employees to signal that they are ‘good’ by adopting
precisely some of the strategies Michael Luo’s New York Times articles
mentioned.161
In response to this tension, they argue, African American employees attempt
to avoid association with stereotypes they believe will hinder their professional
success and advancement by distancing themselves from the problematic
narratives.162 They describe this process as starting with four stages of “racial
See Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 487–503 (1990) (discussing the problematic use of gender stereotypes in
the workplace). See generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial
158

Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (challenging stereotypes in sex discrimination cases

that alleged the lack of interest argument).
159 See generally Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259
(2000); DEVON CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN “POSTRACIAL” AMERICA 19 (2013).
160 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 159, at 1276 (“[O]utsiders subject to
negative stereotypes have greater than normal incentives to put effort and thought into
constructing their workplace identity.”); see also CARBADO & GULATI, ACTING WHITE?, supra
note 159, at 19.
161 CARBADO & GULATI, ACTING WHITE?, supra note 159, at 19.
162 Id. at 24 (“[B]ecause people of color often perceive themselves to be the subjects of
negative stereotyping, they are likely to feel the need to do significant amounts of identity work
to counter those stereotypes.”).

2020]

Outsourcing Discrimination

939

negotiation.”163 In the first stage, the employee distinguishes between identityaffirming conduct that comports with their sense of self and identity-negating
conduct that does not.164 In the second stage, they determines what criteria the
institution (their workplace) values.165 In the third stage, they identifies a tension
between his sense of self and the institution’s values.166 In the fourth stage, they
engages in a “negotiation” by deciding whether to take actions in response to
this tension by adjusting how they “performs” in the workplace.167
Carbado and Gulati proffer six ways this identity performance takes place.
First, the employee may engage in “racial comforting” where they work their
identity to make members of the dominant culture—the “Insiders”—more
comfortable with their “Outsider status.”168 Second, they may engage in
“strategic passing” where they work their identity “to modify the stereotypical
assumptions about or otherwise suppress the salience of” their Outsider
status.169 Third, they may exploit the stereotypes associated with their identity if
doing so could actually create an advantage in the workplace.170 Fourth, they
may opt to create discomfort by emphasizing their Outsider status “in a way that
makes Insiders uncomfortable” in order to push for change in the workplace.171
Fifth, they may decide to “sell out” by making “arguments that work to the
advantage of Insiders so that Insiders can then claim that their arguments are
not self-interested or even racial.”172 Finally, if they believe their chosen identity
performance has been costly to their community, they may try to make amends
by engaging in what Carbado and Gulati term “buying back.” 173 This process
may involve, for example, taking specific actions to support other Outsiders in
the workplace.174
This additional “work” described by Carbado and Gulati enables employees
to navigate the minefields of implicit and explicit bias and stereotypes in order
to succeed in the workplace. Indeed, they describe it as identity work that goes
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 25.
165 Id.
166 Id.
163
164

CARBADO & GULATI, ACTING WHITE?, supra note 159, at 25.
Id. at 26–27.
169 Id. at 29. Carbado and Gulati discuss both “complete passing”⎯where the employee’s
appearance permits them to pretend to literally be a member of the Insider culture⎯as well as
the “partial passing” discussed here. Id. Complete passing is very rare given that it requires the
employee possess a phenotype that causes members of the Insider culture to believe they
employee is a member of that culture. Id.
170 Id. at 33. As an example, Carbado and Gulati describe a Korean American stereotyped
as “hardworking, technically advanced, uncreative, and lacking in leadership skills” who plays
into this stereotype in order to obtain a particular position or assignment he seeks. Id.
167
168

171
172
173
174

Id.
Id. at 34.

CARBADO & GULATI, ACTING WHITE?, supra note 159, at 34–35.
Id. at 34.
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unrecognized and uncompensated, thus creating unfair burdens for diverse
employees.
B. Working Low-Wage Worker Identity?
Carbado and Gulati’s theory of “working identity” focuses exclusively on
white-collar workers.175 Indeed, each example they provide draws from the
experiences of diverse employees working in an office setting.176 Blue-collar
workers’ experiences are largely absent from their analysis. Do low-wage
workers “work their identity” differently than white collar workers? Are there
sufficient differences in the workplace dynamic and workers’ engagement with
one another and their supervisors that performative identity manifests
differently? Finally, do these potential differences help to explain scholars’
repeated findings that racial stereotypes, particularly negative stereotypes about
African American workers, permeate low-wage workspaces?
For my purposes here, I will assume that low-wage workers generally do not
possess the social and economic capital to work their identities in the ways
Carbado and Gulati propose.177 This does not mean that they do not engage in
any performative identity work, just that it may manifest differently and perhaps
less effectively. If low-wage workers do not regularly engage in the type of
identity performance Carbado and Gulati suggest is necessary to counteract
workplace bias, this might explain the prevalence of accepted African American
low-wage worker stereotypes reported in the literature.

V. NORMATIVE RESPONSES OR CRITICAL RACE PRAXIS
While a theoretical understanding of the development of what advocates
consider a widespread, discriminatory industry business practice is critical to
considering potential solutions, critical race theory also demands a consideration
of praxis. Praxis is the practical, structural, and legal considerations that bridge
theory and practice.178 Accordingly, this Article now proceeds to consider
Professor Lisa R. Pruitt argues that Carbado and Gulati seem to conflate race and class
in their descriptions of whiteness by ignoring the plight of the working-class whites who might
also find themselves as outsiders in the “white institutions” discussed therein. See Lisa R. Pruitt,
175

Acting White? Or Acting Affluent? A Book Review of Carbado & Gulati’s Acting White? Rethinking
Race in “Post-Racial” America, 18 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 159, 161 (2015).
176 See CARBADO & GULATI, ACTING WHITE?, supra note 159, at 136–40 (describing the

various decisions a law professor and an outsider law firm associate might make to insulate
themselves from bias in the workplace).
177 Of course, none of this assumes that workers should have to engage in performative
identity strategies in order to insulate themselves from stereotypes and bias in the workplace.
178 See, e.g., Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis,
Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 735 (2003) (“Another tenet that
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potential prescriptive legal shifts that would better enable employees to hold
both the temporary staffing agency and their clients jointly liable for
discriminatory employment practices.
Low-wage workers are less likely to pursue discrimination claims in court.
Indeed, Skrentny opines that “it is not cost effective for individuals to litigate
for access to low-skilled jobs, and the judge-made legal rules for invoking the
law limit its usefulness even to those whom employers deem lacking in ability
because of their race or national origin.”179 Certain changes to the
antidiscrimination laws, however, would better position workers, through
counsel, to challenge discrimination by temporary staffing agencies and their
clients.
A. Litigation Strategies
When temporary workers allege discrimination by the temporary staffing
agency at the instruction of their client, workers typically seek to hold both
entities responsible.180 The worker’s ability to hold the client accountable may
be critically important where the staffing agency is small, undercapitalized, and
therefore ill-positioned to make the worker financially whole.181 When more
than one employer may be liable for the discrimination, however, the potential
for either party to litigate the question of whether it employed the worker
increases substantially. Where any uncertainty in the law exists, parties will
frequently litigate those issues, thus increasing the time and expense associated
with bringing the case. The prospect of lengthy and complicated litigation
typically discourages poor workers from pursuing their rights and therefore
creates a barrier to justice. As such, it is critically important to explore potential
statutory reform that would simplify the litigation of these cases.
First, the record-keeping provisions of Title VII should require more
specific record-keeping practices from temporary staffing agencies. Title VII
requires that employers maintain and preserve records relevant to determining
whether the employer has engaged in discriminatory practices.182 To comply
Critical Race Theorists espouse involves the necessity to engage in praxis, the combining of
theory and practice.”).
179 SKRENTNY, supra note 33, at 251.
180 See supra note 10 and the cases cited therein, all of which include allegations against the
temporary staffing agencies and their clients.
181 See RUCKELSHAUS, supra note 56, at 8 (discussing multiple layers of contractors and
often undercapitalized subcontractors).
182 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–8(c) (1986) (“Every employer, employment agency, and labor
organization subject to this subchapter shall (1) make and keep such records relevant to the
determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been committed, (2) preserve
such records for such periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom as the Commission shall
prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as reasonable, necessary, or appropriate
for the enforcement of this subchapter or the regulations or orders thereunder.”).
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with this requirement, employers typically collect and maintain data regarding
the race of their job applicants. Temporary employment agencies’ policies and
procedures, however, create a potential compliance loophole. In Hunt v. Personnel
Staffing Group,183 one of the staffing agency’s former employees explained that
the agency only required that potential applicants sign in to indicate their interest
in being placed.184 An applicant would only provide explicit information about
his race after the agency selected him from the sign-in list to fill out an
application.185 In a related case, the same agency admitted to shredding the signin sheets that would have tracked the actual potential applicants.186 It thus
destroyed evidence that could have potentially demonstrated the agencies’
refusal to consider African American workers for certain placements.187
Employment discrimination statutes should require that temporary staffing
firms gather and maintain demographic information about all of the workers
that come through their doors to inquire about positions, regardless of whether
they ultimately place them in positions. The practice of requiring workers to sign
in when they arrive but only to complete an application that solicits demographic
information at the agency’s request obscures important data about the race (and
gender) of everyone who expresses interest in positions. By requiring temporary
staffing agencies to collect demographic information about every worker who
expresses interest in employment, potentially important evidence for workers’
allegations of racial discriminatory hiring may be preserved. The use of a sign-

See generally Complaint for Plaintiff, Hunt v. Pers. Staffing Grp., 2018 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 59 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-11086), 2018 WL 1014513.
184 See, e.g., Declaration of Pamela Sanchez, supra note 14, at ¶ 20 (“[L]aborers who walked
into the office in the morning would sign in on a sign-in sheet” that the agency would throw
away at the end of each day.).
183

185
186

Id.
See Deposition of Lisette Robles at 55–56, Lucas v. Gold Standard Baking, 121 Fair

Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1488 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-01524), 2014 WL 518000. Federal
statute requires that certain employers retain demographic information about their job
applicants, not potential job applicants. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (“Any personnel or employment
record made or kept by an employer (including but not necessarily limited to requests for
reasonable accommodation, application forms submitted by applicants and other records having
to do with hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or termination, rates of pay or other
terms of compensation, and selection for training or apprenticeship) shall be preserved by the
employer for a period of one year from the date of the making of the record or the personnel
action involved, whichever occurs later.”).
187 Although, presumably, the sheets by themselves would only have the names of the
workers, not their demographic information. Plaintiffs could reasonably argue that the names
reflect the racial identities of the workers⎯e.g., assuming that those with Spanish surnames were
Latinx and others were African American, particularly if only members of those two groups ever
sought jobs at the agency⎯the information provided on the sign-in sheets would not be
dispositive of the discrimination claim. Nevertheless, such circumstantial evidence would likely
strengthen the claim.
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in list operates as a loophole in Title VII’s record-keeping obligations, and
corrective measures are necessary.188
Second, Congress should amend Title VII to create a presumption of a jointemployer relationship between temporary staffing agencies and their clients in
addition to joint and several liability for statutory violations. The 1997 Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Guidance on Temporary Staffing
Agencies took steps in this direction, but did not go so far as to mandate joint
employment and joint and several liability.189 For example, the policy guidance
explicitly addressed staffing agencies’ and their clients’ obligations to hire in a
nondiscriminatory manner and to take steps to remedy known discrimination
committed by one another.190 While explicit guidance in this area is important,
the creation of a presumptive joint-employer relationship would further
strengthen the protections against discrimination in this industry.
The 2014 amendments to the District of Columbia’s wage and hour laws
provide an instructive example. This legislation sought to respond explicitly to
rampant statutory violations within the temporary staffing industry. The Wage
Theft Prevention Amendment Act of 2014 and its temporary 2016 Correction
and Clarification Act provide:
(f) When a temporary staffing firm employs an employee who performs
work on behalf of or to the benefit of another employer pursuant to a
temporary staffing arrangement or contract for services, both the
temporary staffing firm and the employer shall be jointly and severally
liable for violations of this chapter . . . to the employee and to the
District . . . except as otherwise provided in a contract between the
188 Illinois’s Day and Temporary Labor Services Act mandates that temporary staffing
agencies gather and maintain for three years information on the race and gender of the persons
they send to work as day or temporary workers. However, this requirement only explicitly applies
to workers that the agencies place with clients. Therefore, it falls short of capturing the data that
would demonstrate the discrimination alleged in cases discussed here. Day and Temporary
Labor Services Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1 et. seq. (West 2003).
189 A policy guidance, however, does not change or create law. Moreover, it is subject to
change at the whim of a new administration or agency leadership.
190 The policy guidance explains:
A staffing firm is obligated, as an employer, to make job assignments in a
nondiscriminatory manner. It also is obligated as an employment agency to
make job referrals in a nondiscriminatory manner. The staffing firm’s client
is liable if it sets discriminatory criteria for the assignment of workers . . . . If
a worker is denied a job assignment by a staffing firm because its client
refused to accept the worker for discriminatory reasons, the staffing firm is
liable . . . . The fact that a staffing firm’s discriminatory assignment practice is
based on its client’s requirement is no defense. See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, supra note 42
It is particularly interesting that the EEOC found the final sentence necessary to state and
emphasize as “my client told me to discriminate” has never shielded an employer from liability
for employment discrimination.
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temporary staffing firm and the employer in effect on the effective date
of the Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act of 2014, effective
February 26, 2015.191
The creation of joint and several liability between temporary staffing firms
and their clients creates significant protections for workers who experience
exploitation or discrimination. It removes any concern about who technically
employs the worker and creates an incentive for temporary staffing agencies and
their employers to monitor one another’s activities to make sure neither violates
critical workplace law statutes. While the D.C. statute above applies to wage and
hour laws, the adoption of a similar law within the employment discrimination
context would likewise protect workers from the often precarious nature of
temporary employment and the potential for discriminatory treatment.
Creating the political momentum for significant changes in federal
employment discrimination laws can be incredibly difficult, particularly given
current political dynamics. Accordingly, an exploration of potential changes to
legal doctrine that would better position workers to pursue claims against
temporary staffing agencies and their clients merits serious consideration.
B. Joint-Employer Doctrine
The de-coupling of the employment relationship creates increased ambiguity
about temporary agencies’ and the clients’ legal obligations to workers. Where
the temporary staffing agencies and their clients overlap in the regulation of
workers’ terms of employment, they may both deny their roles as the workers’
employers in an effort to avoid liability for discrimination. In such
circumstances, the joint-employer doctrine under Title VII provides workers the
opportunity to hold both the agencies and their clients responsible. Given the
ways in which staffing agencies and their clients often share the practical dayto-day responsibilities for temporary workers, counsel can often craft strong
arguments for joint liability.192 Nevertheless, the existence of varying tests and a
combination of factors (none of which are dispositive) creates a complicated,
fact-based litigation hurdle that may pose a barrier to workers’ ability to pursue
successful claims against both the temporary staffing agency and their clients.193
191 D.C. CODE § 32–1303 (1956), amended by Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act of
2014, 61 D.C. REG. 10157 (Feb. 26, 2015) and Wage Theft Prevention Correction and
Clarification Temporary Amendment Act of 2016, 63 D.C. REG. 12600 (Nov. 30, 2016).
192 See e.g., Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. Of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 415–16 (4th Cir. 2015)
(applying the hybrid test and finding the temporary staffing agency and client employer joint
employers for the purposes of Title VII); Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d
222, 228–29 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding the staffing agency and joint-employer client liable for
discrimination in violation of the ADA); Nicholson v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 830 F.3d
186, 188–89 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding the staffing agency was potentially liable for their client’s
discrimination).
193 See e.g., Watson v. Adecco Emp’t Servs., 252 F.2d 1347, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (finding
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This Article now identifies the joint-employer doctrine developed in both
Title VII and Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) case law and proposes the
adoption of the more flexible standard that would best capture discrimination
in the temporary worker space.
Title VII
Courts have adopted two different tests to determine whether a jointemployer relationship exists under Title VII. Some courts employ the common
law test defined by the Supreme Court in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., v.
Darden.194 There, the relevant factors include, but are not limited to:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.195
Other courts have adopted a two-step hybrid economic realities/common
law control test that relies heavily on a determination of the right to control the
employee’s conduct.196 That component depends upon “whether the alleged
employer has the right to hire, fire, supervise, and set the work schedule of the
employee”197 while “[t]he economic realities component of the test focuses on
‘whether the alleged employer paid the employee’s salary, withheld taxes,
provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of employment.’”198
The existence of multiple multi-pronged tests, each element of which is nondispositive, to determine joint-employer liability under Title VII creates
uncertainty about when the liability attaches. As a result, defendants in these
cases will almost certainly decide to litigate this issue, resulting in a prolonged
the staffing agency failed to qualify as an employer because it was not in control of the
employee’s duties or responsibilities after assignment); Lima v. Addeco, 634 F. Supp. 2d 394,
401 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting the staffing agencies’ summary judgment motion because they
could not and should not have known about the client’s unlawful discriminatory conduct);
McQueen v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 955 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1272–73 (N.D. Ala. 2013)
(granting the staffing agency’s summary judgment motion because there was no adverse action
attributable to the staffing agency).
194 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
195 Id. at 323–24; see also Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2015)
(using Darden relevant factors in analysis).
196 See Muhammad v. Dall. Cty. Cmty. Supervision & Corr. Dep’t, 479 F.3d 377, 380 (5th
Cir. 2007).
197 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
198 Id. (quoting Deal v. State Farm Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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litigation process that may discourage workers (and, perhaps, their potential
lawyers)199 from pursuing claims. Moreover, both tests involve highly factspecific inquiries that likely occur after discovery. Therefore, the litigation costs
in both time and financial resources are significant.
Fair Labor Standards Act
Judicial interpretation of the FLSA which establishes wage and hour
protections, has generated a different set of multi-factor tests to determine if a
joint-employer relationship exists.200 The tests draw from a more expansive
interpretation of the employee-employer relationship than the narrower
interpretation courts construe from Title VII.201 Title VII defines “employee” as
“an individual employed by an employer,”202 while the FLSA defines
employment as “to suffer or permit to work,”203 and employer as “any person
acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee.”204 This broader understanding of the employee-employer
relationship has led to the development of a more expansive understanding of
the joint-employer relationship under the FLSA.
Courts have found that the existence of joint-employer liability under the
FLSA turns on the “economic realities” of the employment relationship. 205
Circuit courts, however, have adopted and applied different related factors that
drive this analysis.206 In the first economic realities test articulated by the Ninth
Circuit in Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, the court relied upon four
factors: whether the employer “(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees;
(2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of

While large, well-staffed class action firms might take on the larger cases and can absorb
the costs and added risk associated with prolonged litigation, smaller firms may be more riskaverse and shy away from these more complicated cases.
200 The Department of Labor’s regulations implementing FLSA also explicitly recognize
employers’ ability to jointly employ an employee. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (“A single individual
may stand in the relation of an employee to two or more employers at the same time under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, since there is nothing in the act which prevents an individual
employed by one employer from also entering into an employment relationship with a different
employer.”).
201 See Benjamin F. Barry, Testing Economic Reality: FLSA and Title VII Protection for
Workfare Participants, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 561, 562–63 (2009) (comparing FLSA and Title VII
definitions of “employee”).
202 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1986).
203 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (1938).
204 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1938).
205 See, e.g., Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency¸ 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
206 See Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 135 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[C]ourts’
attempts to distinguish separate employment from joint employment have spawned numerous
multifactor balancing tests, none of which has achieved consensus support.”).
199
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employment; (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and;
(4) maintained employment records.”207
Since Bonnette, the circuit courts have articulated different sets of factors that
further interrogate the relationship between the potential joint employers and
the employee. The Second Circuit has articulated six factors relevant to
determining whether joint employment exists:
(1) Whether the manufacturer’s premises and equipment were used for
the plaintiffs’ work;
(2) Whether the contractors had a business that could or did shift as a
unit from one putative joint employer to another;
(3) The extent to which the workers perform a line-job integral to the
joint entity’s process of production;
(4) Whether responsibilities under the contracts could pass from one
subcontractor to another without material changes;
(5) The degree to which the putative employer supervises the
employee’s work; and
(6) Whether the workers’ work is exclusively and predominantly for the
putative employer.208
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit articulated yet another set of factors. In
Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., the court argued that a determination of joint
employment should focus on the relationship between the two putative
employers, rather than the employee and each of the putative employers.209 The
court proffered six, non-exhaustive factors:
(1) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint
employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to direct,
control, or supervise the worker, whether by direct or indirect means;
(2) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint
employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to–directly or
indirectly–hire or fire the worker or modify the terms or conditions of
the worker’s employment;
(3) The degree of permanency and duration of the relationship between
the putative joint employers;
(4) Whether, through shared management or a direct or indirect
ownership interest, one putative joint employer controls, is controlled
by, or is under common control with the other putative joint employer;

Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 (internal quotation omitted).
Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. Inc., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003).
209 See Salinas, 848 F.3d at 139. Specifically, the court argued the joint employment inquiry
“requires courts to determine whether the putative joint employers are not wholly disassociated
or, put different, share or codetermine essential terms and conditions of a worker’s
employment.” Id.
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(5) Whether the work is performed on a premises owned or controlled
by one or more of the putative joint employers, independently or in
connection with one another; and
(6) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint
employers jointly determine, share, or allocate responsibility over
functions ordinarily carried out by an employer, such as handling payroll;
providing workers’ compensation insurance; paying payroll taxes; or
providing the facilities, equipment, tools, or materials necessary to
complete the work.210
In April 2019, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) further complicated the
debate about the appropriate joint-employer test under the FLSA. The DOL
issued a proposed rule interpreting the joint-employer standard that narrowed
the test to four factors that are substantially similar to those articulated in
Bonnette.211 However, the DOL’s proposal construes the joint-employer test
more narrowly than Bonnette because it requires that the potential employer have
actually exercised its power to hire and fire the worker, not just possess the
power to do so.212 Thus, the DOL seeks to employ a more restrictive
understanding of joint-employer liability than most circuit courts.
While courts have thus far refused to construe the joint-employer
relationship under Title VII similarly to the FLSA, the latter’s tests—excluding
the DOL’s proposed rule—would better serve workers’ efforts to demonstrate
joint employment in the temporary staffing industry. For example, the Second
Circuit’s six-factor test in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. focuses on the relationship
between the work completed and the employer’s business, rather than simply
the relationship between the employer and the employee. Temporary staffing
agencies’ clients would find it difficult to argue, for example, that workers did
not use their equipment and perform jobs integral to their productivity, and that
the clients did not supervise the workers’ day-to-day activities. Moreover, the
five-factor test articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Salinas centers its analysis on
the relationship between the alleged joint employers such that the day-to-day
activities of each employee do not dictate whether liability attaches. By removing
the need for individualized analysis of any particular employee’s relationship
with the agency or its clients and focusing instead on the relationship between
the employers, this test better positions workers to establish a joint-employer
relationship.

210
211

Id. at 141–42.
See Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 14043,

14044 (Apr. 9, 2019). The proposed test would assess whether the potential employer: (1)
“[h]ires or fires the employee;” (2) “[s]upervises and controls the employee’s work schedule or
conditions of employment;” (3) “[d]etermines the employee’s rate and method of payment; and”
(4) “[m]aintains the employee’s employment records.” Id.
212
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Neither the Title VII tests nor the FLSA tests are optimal, however. Under
both laws, the need to litigate a multi-pronged test creates barriers to
enforcement. The creation of automatic joint liability for temporary staffing
agencies and their client is necessary to sufficiently deter discriminatory
employment practices in this growing and evolving employment space.

CONCLUSION
The rapidly changing low-wage workplace has evolved to frequently include
temporary staffing agencies and other labor intermediaries that complicate the
employment relationship. Various studies identify the myriad ways in which the
prevalence of temporary staffing arrangements is detrimental to the protection
of workers’ rights. Less studied and discussed, however, are the ways in which
these relationships create vehicles for discriminatory employment practices.
Furthermore, ethnographies of racial dynamics in the low-wage workplace
reveal rampant stereotypical beliefs about workers that consistently characterize
African Americans as the least desirable workers and often characterize
immigrant Latinxs as the most desirable. The collision of the structural changes
to the workplace with rampant, widely accepted stereotypes yields what
advocates allege is significant racial discrimination in the temporary staffing
industry.
Racial realism, narrative, and performance identity theories help to explain
the persistence of explicitly racially discriminatory dynamics in the temporary
staffing work space, despite scholars’ insistence that racial discrimination in
employment has shifted into more implicit or structural forms.213 Carbado and
Gulati’s “working identity” theory is particularly instructive. If African
Americans in the white-collar workplace engage in specific identity performance
to avoid stereotypical treatment by their colleagues while African Americans in
the low-wage worker sector are less likely to engage in this performative process,
perhaps the persistence of negative stereotypes and the resulting discriminatory
employment practices are the predictable results. The addition of a labor
intermediary such as temporary staffing agencies may then shield companies
from liability for discriminatory hiring by complicating the employment
relationship and making more difficult any potential litigation of discrimination
claims.
Accordingly, employment discrimination statutes should contemplate joint
and several liability for temporary staffing agencies and their clients and require
that staffing agencies maintain demographic data on every worker who
213 See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White , 2005

WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2005) (discussing the effectiveness of Title VII “especially as
employment discrimination has evolved into different forms”).
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expresses interest in applying for a position through their agency. In the
alternative, courts should greatly simplify the test for determining whether a
joint-employer relationship exists in cases involving temporary staffing agencies.

